



Remuneration report

The purpose of the remuneration policies is to attract, motivate and retain qualified executives and non-executives. The remuneration policies intend set the framework for competitive remuneration, to enable Arcadis to compete with companies similar to Arcadis, in terms of size and complexity. The remuneration policies for the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board are proposed by the Supervisory Board to the Annual General Meeting, based on the advice of the Arcadis Remuneration Committee ('RemCo'). The current Executive Board remuneration policy was adopted in 2021. The current Supervisory Board remuneration policy was adopted in 2020.

Introduction

This report outlines the application of the remuneration policies for the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board in 2022 as well as actual performance in 2022 against set performance criteria.

2022 General Meeting

During the 2022 General Meeting of shareholders, the remuneration report for the Executive Board 2021 and the remuneration report for the Supervisory Board 2021 were submitted for an advisory vote. The meeting participants did not raise any questions on the reports and positive advisory votes were cast regarding both remuneration reports.

2022 financial performance

2022 has been another successful year for Arcadis. Our business is in a strong position, with healthy organic and profitable growth and record net revenue and backlogs. We have made significant progress in delivering on our strategic priorities by fully implementing our Global Business Area structure and by adding exciting companies and people to our group. Providing sustainable solutions to clients remains at our core and is key to our successful projects with and for clients. With the launch of our new Global Business Area Intelligence we are truly becoming a digital leader in our industry.

We achieved our strong results in the context of geo-political turbulence and increased economic uncertainty. We are encouraged that despite these uncertainties, national governments, public agencies and the private sector continue to invest. They recognize the need to tackle climate change and to address biodiversity loss to enable healthier lives, thriving nature, effortless transport, and more enjoyable places.

Alignment between remuneration and performance of the company

The total remuneration in 2022 for both Executive Board and Supervisory Board is in line with the applicable remuneration policies.

The total remuneration for the Executive Board consists of fixed remuneration and variable remuneration. The short-term incentive financial criteria that were selected for 2022 are EBITA Margin, Free Cash Flow and Net Order Intake Key Clients.

These criteria are directly linked to our Strategy "Maximizing Impact"; accelerating our ability to meet our client's needs driven by the megatrends in the world such as urbanization, climate change, digitalization and societal expectations. We aim to create impact through our Sustainable Solutions, our Digital Leadership and by leveraging our Focus and Scale. These strategic pillars, support the long-term performance of the company. The financial criteria (EBITA Margin and Net Order Intake Key Clients) are directly connected to sustainable and profitable revenue growth, while making sure enough free cash flow is generated (i.e. the third financial criterion).



To make sure Arcadis has an engaged workforce, the Supervisory Board decided to introduce Employee Engagement as the fourth criterion (replacing the Revenue Growth) and as one of two non-financial criteria. As Employee Engagement is a leading indicator, this metric was chosen over Voluntary Attrition. As we continued with the implementation of our strategy in 2022, the success of the transformation has been chosen as individual, non-financial fifth criterion for the members of the Executive Board.

For the long-term incentive, the selected criteria Total Shareholder Return, Earnings per Share and Sustainability, reflect the long-term performance of the Company. These criteria ensured alignment with shareholder interests.

The total remuneration for the Supervisory Board is in line with the remuneration policy for the Supervisory Board, as approved by the General Meeting in 2020.

Executive Board remuneration

Remuneration in line with median level of reference groups

The remuneration policy for Executive Board members aims to support the business strategy, enhance the link between pay and performance and align the interests of our Executive Board members with shareholders' interests by stimulating share ownership while adopting the highest standards of good corporate governance. Remuneration for Executive Board members consists of fixed remuneration, short-term variable remuneration, long-term variable remuneration and other benefits, such as a pension scheme. Variable remuneration is an important part of the total package and is based on performance criteria that support long-term value creation.

Arcadis has developed from a multi-local company to a leading global natural and built asset design and consultancy company. In order to align with Arcadis' size (in terms of revenues, average market capitalization, total assets and number of FTE), geographic and industry scope, and labor market competition, a labor market reference group has been defined. The reference group consists of Dutch headquartered companies with significant international activities, supplemented by global industry peers, as presented below.

Dutch headquartered companies with significant international activities

Aalberts Industries
AkzoNobel
ASM International
BAM
Boskalis
DSM
Fugro
SBM Offshore
TKH Group
Vopak

Global industry peer companies

AF Pöyry (FIN)
RPS Group (UK)
SNC Lavalin (CAN)
Stantec (CAN)
Sweco (SE)
WSP Global (CAN)

Within this group, Arcadis positions around the median in terms of the average of the aforementioned parameters revenues, average market capitalization, total assets and number of FTE.

With the Total Direct Compensation levels (the sum of base salary, short-term variable compensation and long-term variable compensation), the Executive Board remuneration policy aims to be at around the median of the Total Direct Compensation levels of this reference group.

¹ Changes to the reference group may be required from time to time e.g. following mergers or acquisitions in which one or more companies in the reference group are involved.



Internal pay ratio

When developing the remuneration policy for the Executive Board, Arcadis considered the pay ratio within the organization. The methodology used, in line with the guidance of the Dutch Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance assesses the ratio between the total annual remuneration of the CEO at one hand and the average annual remuneration of the employees of the company and group companies whose financial data is consolidated by the company at the other hand, where:

- total annual remuneration of the CEO includes all the remuneration components (such as fixed remuneration, variable cash remuneration (short term incentive), the share-based part of the remuneration (long term incentive), social contributions, pension, expense allowance, etc.) included in the consolidated annual accounts on an IFRS basis;
- the average annual remuneration of the employees is determined by dividing the total wage costs in the financial year (as included in the consolidated annual accounts on an IFRS basis) by the average number of FTEs during the financial year; in addition, the hiring of external employees is considered pro rata, insofar as they are hired for at least three months during the financial year; and
- value of the share-based component of the remuneration is determined at the time of assignment in accordance with the applicable rules under IFRS.

Based on this new methodology, the following pay ratios are determined:

Year	Pay ratio	CEO remuneration (€1,000)
2019	29	2,175
2020 ²	18	1,266
2021	31	2,244
2022	28	2,156

² The 2020 pay ratio is significantly lower due to lower value of short term incentive (STI) and long term incentive (LTI) as part of the CEO remuneration. In 2020, the CEO informed the Supervisory Board that he decided not to accept the STI payout due to him. In addition, the LTI value at grant was lower due to the lower fair value of the grant date. This led to a significantly lower CEO remuneration.

³ In 2021, the period used to determine the VWAP was early 2021, whereas the grant date was in May 2021. This led to a difference in award value and fair value, which explains the changing LTI value. This has been adjusted per the 2022 LTI grant.

⁴ Percentages mentioned are the on-target levels.

The 2022 CEO pay ratio is slightly lower than the 2021 ratio. This is mainly caused by the fact that the long-term incentive (LTI) award fair value³ was lower.

Total Direct Compensation Mix

The relative proportion of the annual base salary and the short-term and long-term variable compensation components⁴ of the members of the Executive Board is as follows:

Executive Board member	Annual fixed remuneration	Short-term Variable	Long-term Variable	Total
Chief Executive Officer	39%	19%	42%	100%
Chief Financial Officer	40%	20%	40%	100%

The total compensation has a relatively strong focus on long-term remuneration, which reflects the importance of alignment with the long-term strategy and long-term value creation of the Company and with shareholder interests.

Fixed remuneration

In line with the remuneration policy for the Executive Board, the Supervisory Board determines the base salaries of the members of the Executive Board on an annual basis. The Supervisory Board determines the base salaries based on benchmarking against the labor market reference group, market movements, salary increases of employees and other considerations as are deemed appropriate. The increase of base salaries of the members of the Executive Board will not exceed the average increase for employees, unless the benchmarking exercise indicates differently.

In 2022, the Supervisory Board decided to increase the fixed compensation for the Executive Board by 4%, which is in line with remuneration policy for the Executive Board, i.e. compensation for average increase in the market, and in line with the average increase for employees. The following annual fixed remuneration levels applied to members of the Executive Board in 2022.



Executive Board member	2022 Annual fixed remuneration
CEO (P. Oosterveer)	€687,000
CFO (V. Duperat-Vergne)	€494,000

For 2023, the Supervisory Board decided to increase the fixed compensation of the CEO and the CFO with 2%, which is in line with the remuneration policy for the Executive Board, i.e. compensation for average increase in the market and in line with the average increase for employees. In view of his retirement, the fixed compensation of the current CEO will not be adjusted.

Executive Board member	2023 Annual fixed remuneration
CEO (Successor P. Oosterveer)	€687,000 ⁵
CEO	€701,000
CFO (V. Duperat-Vergne)	€504,000

Short-term variable remuneration

The short-term variable compensation serves to incentivize the Executive Board to meet short term performance criteria. The short-term variable compensation is a percentage of base salary and ranges from 0% to 85% of the annual base salary, with 50% being the target. The short-term variable compensation is payable in cash. The payment is made in March, the year following the year of review.

No pay out will be made in case none of the performance criteria meet the threshold target. Pay out for performance between threshold and targets and between target and maximum is based on a linear calculation approach. All short-term variable compensation criteria allow for rewarding strong performance.

Performance criteria STI

To support the Company's strategy, the criteria for the short-term variable compensation are based on the strategy and are partly financial and partly non-financial. Based on the annual priorities of the Company, the Supervisory Board determines the performance criteria applicable to the short-term variable compensation in their meeting prior to the performance year.

In line with the remuneration policy for the Executive Board, the Supervisory Board will select from the following performance criteria:

1. Financial criteria (minimum 60% weighting):

- Profit/ Margin
- Revenue/ Growth
- Cash Flow
- Capital return measures (such as ROA, ROE, ROIC)
- Economic/ Market value added measures

2. Non-financial criteria:

- Customer results (e.g. net promotor score)
- People & organization (e.g. employee engagement, voluntary turnover)
- Sustainability (e.g. carbon footprint reduction)
- Individual non-financial criterion (e.g. measuring the success of the implementation of the strategy)

The targets (threshold, target and maximum) for each of the performance criteria will be determined annually by the Supervisory Board by reference to the business plan for the respective year and considering the strategic aspirations of the Company.

The actual realization on each of the criteria will be reported in the remuneration report relating to the relevant performance year. No payout will be made for meeting a performance criterion in case the performance does not meet the threshold target.

The Supervisory Board has the discretion to make adjustments, for example to account for events that were not planned when targets were set or were outside of management's control. The Supervisory Board has not applied the derogation clause in 2022.

⁵ Amount to be prorated based on appointment during financial year 2023.



For performance year 2022, the Supervisory Board selected the following three financial performance criteria for the short-term remuneration of the members of the Executive Board:

- Reported EBITA%
- Free Cash Flow
- Net Order Intake Key Clients

In addition, considering the strategic importance of attracting and retaining employees, the Supervisory Board selected Employee Engagement as one of two non-financial criteria. The selection of Employee Engagement is in line with our strategy as Employee Engagement is an Environmental, Social and Governmental (ESG) target. Employee Engagement is measured by the employee Net Promoter Score (eNPS), which is measured quarterly. The eNPS score is a rolling average of 12 months. eNPS is measured based on our employee engagement survey. Employees complete a questionnaire on a quarterly basis, which will lead to the eNPS score.

Finally, the Supervisory Board decided to continue to set an individual (non-financial) criterion to measure the success of the implementation of the new strategy. For each member of the Executive Board an individual target applied in line with their role in the transformation. The Supervisory Board assessed the performance against this individual criterion at the end of the year based on the progress made in 2022.

The weighting of each metric is 20%.

In 2022, the performance of the company against the targets set was as follows.

Criterion	Threshold	Target	Maximum	Realization	Payout as % of target	Payout as % of fixed compensation
Reported EBITA %	9.3%	9.8%	10.3%	9,61%	73.4%	7.3%
Free cash flow (€ million)	113	153	183	198.5	170%	17.0%
Net Order Intake Key Clients (€ million)	1,101	1,223	1,345	1,427	170%	17.0%
Employee Engagement	34	36	38	39	170%	17.0%

Realization of Reported EBITA and Free cashflow based on constant currency and perimeter which excludes Acquisitions and Divestments.

The realization on the individual non-financial criterion linked to the transformation for the members of the Executive Board was assessed by the Supervisory Board at 170%. The target for the members of the Executive Board was developing and implementing the transformation plan. The Supervisory Board concluded this target has been overachieved.

The performance on the financial targets, the non-financial criterion Employee Engagement and the individual non-financial criterion linked to the implementation of the strategy (as assessed by the Supervisory Board) leads to the following payout:

Name	Annual Base Salary (€)	STI target %	Realization (as percentage of Annual Base Salary)					Payout (€)	
			Reported EBITA%	Free cash flow	Organic net revenue growth %	Net Order Intake Key Client	Individual non-financial criterion		Total
CEO (P. Oosterveer)	687,000	50%	7.3%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	75.3%	517,586
CFO (V. Duperat-Vergne)	494,000	50%	7.3%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	75.3%	372,180

For 2023, the Supervisory Board decided to make a few changes to the performance criteria for short-term remuneration. Firstly, Reported EBITA margin will be replaced by Operating EBITA margin. For the performance of the business, the Operating EBITA margin is a more appropriate measure. As Arcadis has embarked on a number of acquisitions, the focus on Operating EBITA is even more important. In addition, the Supervisory Board decided to add a Free Cashflow threshold. The group Free Cashflow threshold needs to be met, before any short term variable remuneration is payable.

⁶ For the 2022 grant, the Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) was based on the average share price of five days (9-13 May 2022) prior to the actual grant date (16 May 2022).



These changes lead to the following set of criteria:

Financial criteria:

- Operating EBITA margin %
- Free Cash Flow
- Net Order Intake Key Clients

Non-financial criteria:

- Employee Engagement
- Individual criterion: measuring the success of the implementation of the strategy

Threshold applying to any short-term remuneration payout:

- Free Cash Flow

All targets will be disclosed in the 2023 remuneration report.

Long-term variable remuneration: performance shares

The long-term variable remuneration aims to align the interests of the members of the Executive Board with long-term shareholder's interests. Therefore, under the remuneration policy, members of the Executive Board receive annually conditional performance shares. The conditional performance shares will vest and become unconditional after three years and are restricted for another two years after vesting.

The value of the annual award is determined by a percentage of fixed remuneration. The actual grant is determined by the value divided by the applicable Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP)⁶.

In 2022, the members of the Executive Board received the following Long-term variable remuneration:

	% of fixed remuneration	Grant value (in €)	VWAP (in €)	Number of shares	Fair value (in €)	Total IFRS grant value (in €)
CEO (P. Oosterveer)	110%	755,700	37,14	20,350	35,19	716,117
CFO (V. Duperat-Vergne)	100%	494,000	37,14	13,303	35,19	468,133

Performance criteria long-term variable remuneration

In order to support the three strategic pillars of the strategy, the performance criteria are:

- Total Shareholder Return
- Earnings per share
- Sustainability

Each parameter counts for 33.33%.

Performance Criterion 1: Total Shareholder Return

The vesting percentage of the performance shares is conditional upon the achievement of performance measured as relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR), which is defined as share price movements including dividends, assuming dividends are reinvested over three years.

The TSR performance of Arcadis is measured against the performance of direct competitors.

Since various companies in the TSR peer group were delisted in the course of 2022 four companies were added to the TSR peer group to replace the companies that have been delisted:

Q2 Cardno replaced by NV5 (US)

Q3 Wood Group replaced by Alten (FR)

Q4 RPS Group replaced by Spie (FR)

Q4 Hill International replaced by Fugro (NL)

⁷ % growth from t0 to tx, divided by # years. The score will be based on the Sustainalytics score of 2025.



The current TSR group is as follows:

TSR peer group

Arcadis (NL)	AF Pöyry (FIN)	Stantec (CAN)
AECOM (U.S.)	Spie (FR)	Alten (FR)
NV5 (US)	SNC-Lavalin (CAN)	Worley Parsons (AUS)
Fugro (NL)	Sweco (SE)	WSP Global (CAN)
Jacobs Engineering (U.S.)	Tetra Tech (U.S.)	

The position of Arcadis within the peer group, after three years, determines the final number of conditional performance shares that vest and becomes unconditional, in accordance with the following table:

Ranking	14-8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Vesting %	0%	50%	75%	100%	125%	150%	175%	200%

Performance Criterion 2: Earnings Per Share

Earnings Per Share (“EPS”) is calculated by applying the simple point-to-point⁷ method at the end of the period. EPS is disclosed in our Consolidated Financial statement and is calculated by dividing the net income from operations by the weighted average number of shares outstanding during the period, excluding ordinary shares purchased by the Company and held as treasury shares (i.e. shares purchased to cover share/ option plans). Earnings are adjusted for changes in accounting principles during the performance period. The Supervisory Board has the discretion to include other adjustments, for example, the account for events that were not planned when targets were set or were outside of management’s control.

The EPS growth target, threshold and maximum are set annually by the Supervisory Board. Given that these targets are commercially sensitive, EPS targets and the achieved performance are published in the Annual Report after the relevant performance period.

⁸ The score will be based on the Sustainalytics score of 2025.

The following performance incentive zones will be used to define the vesting for this part of the conditional grant:

	< Threshold	Threshold	Target	Maximum
EPS	nil	50%	100%	150%

Performance Criterion 3: Sustainability (Sustainalytics score (ESG))

The sustainability target will be measured by reference to the ‘Management score’ applied to the Company by Sustainalytics, a leading independent global Environmental, Social and Governmental (“ESG”) ratings firm which provides a robust analytical framework that addresses a broad range of ESG issues and trends that have a significant and material impact on industries and companies. Sustainalytics analyzes and rates the performance of 16,000+ companies globally across 138 Sustainalytics-defined sub-industry classifications. The analysis is made by looking at and weighting the core and sub-industry specific metrics to determine the overall ESG Risk performance.

The following performance incentive zones and targets will be used to define the vesting for this part of the conditional grant:

	< Threshold	Threshold	Target	Maximum
Sustainalytics score	0	50%	100%	150%
Target performance period 2023 - 2025 ⁸		76.3	77.3	78.3

The target of this performance criterion was set using the Sustainalytics ESG Risk Rating methodology; realization will be assessed with the methodology applicable to Arcadis’ Sustainalytics sub-industry (‘non-residential construction’) in 2022. Please note the 2023-2025 target is lower than the previous years due to Sustainalytics’ methodology being updated to include additional material ESG issues (MEIs) for Arcadis’ subindustry in 2022, leading to a change in baseline. Arcadis remains committed to improving its own operations in a sustainable fashion and will continue to focus its sustainability efforts on areas that are most relevant.



The sustainability target includes a wide range of performance objectives in Arcadis' material ESG issues as defined by Sustainalytics. For example: human capital (roll-out of global mentorship program with a diversity focus), carbon and environmental management (progress towards achieving our 'Net-Zero' target) and human rights (implementing a three-year roadmap for embedding human rights standards in our operations).

Conditional performance shares held by member of the Executive Board

In 2022, the aggregate numbers of conditional performance shares held by members of the Executive Board are as per below. The Executive board members did not hold any stock options in 2022.

Number of conditional (performance) shares Arcadis NV Current Executive Board members	31 December 2022	31 December 2021
P. Oosterveer	80,738	111,443
V. Duperat-Vergne	35,238	21,935

Vested shares

Conditional performance shares vested in 2022

Over the performance period 2019 – 2021, the performance criteria TSR, EPS and Sustainalytics were applied. The realization on these performance criteria was:

Criterion	Weight	Threshold	Target	Max	Realization	
					Value	Percentage
Total Shareholder Return	33%		n/a		Rank 1	200%
Earnings per share growth	33%	9.3%	10.9%	12.6%	26%	150%
Sustainalytics	33%	72	76	78	80	150%
Overall	100%					165%

As a result of the realization, the following number of shares will vest in 2022 per the vesting date.

# shares	2019 grant	2022 vesting
CEO (P. Oosterveer)	51,055	84,241

Conditional performance shares to vest in 2023

Over the performance period 2020 – 2022, the performance criteria TSR, EPS and Sustainalytics were applied.

The realization on these performance criteria was:

Criterion	Weight	Threshold	Target	Max	Realization	
					Value	Percentage
Total Shareholder Return	33%	-	n/a	-	Rank 3	150%
Earnings per share growth	33%	6.87%	8.09%	9.30%	16.8%	150%
Sustainalytics	33%	75	77	79	80	150%
Overall	100%					150%

As a result of the realization, the following number of shares will vest in 2023 per the vesting date.

# shares	2020 grant	2023 vesting
CEO (P. Oosterveer)	35,817	53,726

The members of the Executive Board must retain the shares awarded under the long-term variable remuneration for a period of at least five years from the grant date, while allowing part of the shares to be sold to cover taxes due on the date of vesting, if any.



Total remuneration

The total remuneration of the Executive Board members over 2022 and 2021, split by component and presented in relative proportion between fixed and variable remuneration is as follows:

Name of Director position (in € 1,000)	Reporting year	1. Fixed remuneration		2. Variable remuneration		3. Extraordinary items	4. Pension Expenses	5. Total remuneration	6. Proportion of fixed and variable remuneration	
		Base salary	Fringe benefits	One-year variable	Multi-year variable				Fixed	Variable
CEO (P. Oosterveer) based on due	2021	820	62	486	0	n/a	19	1,386	64%	36%
	2022	845	58	518	3,098	n/a	19	4,538	20%	80%
CEO (P. Oosterveer) based on IFRS	2021	820	62	486	744	n/a	19	2,130	42%	58%
	2022	845	58	518	1,392	n/a	19	2,832	32%	68%
CFO (V. Duperrat-Vergne) based on due	2021	544	190	349	0	n/a	19	1,102	68%	32%
	2022	561	267	372	0	n/a	19	1,220	69%	31%
CFO (V. Duperrat-Vergne) based on IFRS	2021	544	190	349	160	n/a	19	1,262	59%	41%
	2022	561	267	372	372	n/a	19	1,592	53%	47%



Retirement and other benefits, contracts

Retirement benefits

In 2022, all Executive Board members participated in the Arcadis Netherlands pension plan. This is a collective defined contribution plan with the premium based on the ambition of a pension payment. The contribution from the participants is 6,64% of the pensionable salary (annual base salary minus offset) for the salary part below €114,866 (maximum pensionable salary under Dutch tax legislation). Executive Board members participating in the Arcadis Netherlands pension plan also receive an annual cash allowance in line with legislation in the Netherlands for the salary above €114,866. The participation of the Executive Board members is aligned with the arrangement for employees.

Other benefits

Executive Board members receive a net fixed expense allowance, as well as other customary fringe benefits, including the use of a company car or a mobility allowance. In line with best practice, the company provides benefits which the Supervisory Board considers appropriate for a global company which needs to attract and retain Executive Board members from different parts of the world.

Management agreements and severance pay

In line with current Dutch legislation, all Executive Board members work for Arcadis NV under a management agreement: Mr. P. Oosterveer⁹ (appointed in 2017 and reappointed in 2021) has a four-year term and Mrs. V. Duperat-Vergne (appointed in 2020) has a term until the general meeting to be held in the fourth year after the appointment. They may be entitled to a severance pay with a maximum of one year's base salary. Management agreements with Executive Board members do not contain provisions on severance payments in case of termination resulting from a change in control.

Other elements of the remuneration policy

The Dutch Corporate Governance Code contains additional best practices regarding executive remuneration. Based on the advice of the RemCo, the Supervisory Board is satisfied that it has complied with these additional best practices in 2022. Before setting proposed targets for Supervisory Board approval, the RemCo carried out scenario analyses of the possible financial outcomes of meeting target levels, as well as maximum performance levels, and how they may affect the level and structure of the total remuneration of the members of the Executive Board.

⁹ Mr. Oosterveer announced in October 2022 that he will retire in May 2023.



Supervisory Board remuneration

The remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board consists of a fixed fee and an attendance fee. Given the nature of the responsibilities of the Supervisory Board, the remuneration is not tied to the performance of the Company and therefore includes fixed compensation only. In line with the Dutch corporate governance code, the members of the Supervisory Board will not be rewarded in equity-based compensation.

The remuneration for Supervisory Board members was last adjusted in 2020, based on a benchmark analysis by an external advisor of remuneration at Dutch Headquartered companies with significant international activities.

The remuneration of the Supervisory Board members is as follows:

In €	Chair	Member
Annual fixed remuneration Supervisory Board	85,000	58,000
Membership AARC	12,000	8,000
Membership ASC and RemCo	10,000	7,000
Membership of SusCo	8,000	6,000

In 2020, the General Meeting approved an attendance fee for all Supervisory Board members of €2,500 for every visit for meetings that take place outside of the country of domicile of a Supervisory Board member and that does not involve intercontinental travel, or €4,000 for every visit for meetings that involves intercontinental travel. No attendance fee is paid if the meeting takes place in the country of domicile of a Supervisory Board member or if the Supervisory Board member attended the meeting online.

As is deemed necessary, the Supervisory Board may decide to introduce additional committees. The annual fixed fee for such additional committee membership(s) will be dependent upon the expected number of committee meetings per annum (€2,000 per meeting for the chair, with a maximum fixed annual fee of €8,000; and €1,500 per meeting for a member, with a maximum fixed annual fee of €6,000).

Members of the Supervisory Board participating in more than two committees, will only be compensated for their membership of the two committees with the highest fees. The combined membership of the Remuneration Committee and ASC is considered one committee membership for the purpose of remuneration.

Remuneration of Supervisory Board members is not dependent on company results. Supervisory Board members are not eligible to receive shares or options as part of their remuneration package. Possible share ownership of Arcadis shares by a Supervisory Board member is meant as a long-term investment.

Total remuneration

The total remuneration of the Supervisory Board members over 2022:

In €	Carla Mahieu	Deanna Goodwin	Michael Putnam	Michiel Lap	Niek Hoek	Wee Gee Ang
Supervisory Board membership	58,000	58,000	58,000	75,129	67,871	58,000
Committee membership	10,000	16,538	16,000	15,806	15,462	7,000
Attendance allowance	0	16,000	7,500	10,000	0	12,000
Total	68,000	90,538	81,500	100,935	83,333	77,000

Other information

The Company has not granted any loans, advances or guarantees to Executive or Supervisory Board members. The articles of association of Arcadis NV provide current and former Executive Board members and Supervisory Board members with an indemnification for all costs and expenses arising from and against any claim, action or lawsuit related to actions and/ or omissions in their function as Executive Board or Supervisory Board members.

On behalf of the Arcadis Remuneration Committee

Carla Mahieu, Chair